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analyzed whether that judgment was the kind of judgment Congress designed
the discretionary function exemption to shield- namely, governmental actions
based on public policy concerns. Firebaugh argued the exemption should not
apply because the Act imposed a duty on the Interior that was divorced from
discretion. The court rejected this argument based on its Frebaugh I ruling,
holding Interior had broad discretion in providing a drainage solution. Further, the court reasoned that Interior's actions were grounded in multiple public policy concerns and, therefore, the discretionary function exemption applied, negating Firebaugh's FTCA claim.
For Firebaugh's second claim under the APA to prevail, the court required Firebaugh to demonstrate that Interior failed to take a discrete action
that it was legally required to take. Firebaugh argued Interior failed to make
two specific actions the Act required: (1) to provide drainage to lands outside
the Unit, and (2) to provide drainage to lands inside the Unit. The court rejected these assertions. First, it held the Act merely authorized Interior to construct drainage facilities outside the Unit; Interior was not required to do so.
Congress never gave Interior discretion to choose necessary drainage facilities,
so providing drainage to lands outside the Unit was not a discrete action Congress required Interior to take. Second, although the court recognized that
progress on the in-valley drainage solution was slow, it held Intcrior was not
withholding nor unreasonably delaying drainage within the Unit. The court
reasoned that the scope and cost of the project was the root of the delay, not
Interior failing to take action. Therefore, Firebaugh's second contention failed
as well.
The court affirmed the district court's ruling that Interior was not required
to provide drainage to lands outside the Unit, Interior was not unlawfully withholding nor unreasonably delaying drainage within the Unit, and that the discretionary function exemption prohibited a federal tort claim against Interior.
James Hanseen

Tehama-Colusa Canal Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 721 F.3d 1086 (9th
Cir. 2013) (holding area of origin statutes did not control the allocation of federally appropriated water during times of shortage when valid contracts contained no area of origin provision and explicitly allowed for reduced allocation
during times of shortage).
The Central Valley Project ("CVP") diverts water from California's two
largest rivers, the Sacramento and San Joaquin, for beneficial use throughout
the state. The CVP operates under a cooperative agreement between the California State Department of Water Resources and the federal Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau"). Under the CVP, the State Water Resource Control
Board ("SWRCB") issued permits to the Bureau to appropriate water from
the Sacremento Valley Basin. Water users then acquire water through contracts with the Bureau, as opposed to the standard practice of obtaining ap-

propriative rights to California water sources through the SWRCB. In the absence of operational constraints or contract terms dictating priority allocation,
the Bureau distributes water on a pro rata basis. In addition, all contractors
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generally receive less than their contracted allocation during times of water
shortage.
Members of the Tehama-Colusa Canal Authority ("Canal Authority") first
signed contracts with the Bureau in the 1960's and 1970's, and many of those
contracts were set to expire in 1995. Members then executed long-term renewal contracts in 2005. The renewal contracts contained language similar to
the original contracts, giving the Bureau discretion to reduce allocations to
Canal Authority members during times of water shortage. The renewal contracts also required each Canal Authority member to initiate actions in state
court to confirm the validity of the contracts. All members did so.
After receiving less than their contractual allocations due to shortage,
members of the Canal Authority sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the U.S. Department of Interior ("Interior") and other defendants.
Members of the Canal Authority argued that the California Water Code
("CWC") entitled them to priority water allocation, even during times of water
shortage. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California ("district court") granted summary judgment for defendants, and the Canal
Authority appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ("court") addressed
four issues in reaching its decision: (i) whether the Bureau's decision to reduce
water allocations was arbitrary, (ii) whether the CWC required the Bureau to
allocate water based on area of origin statutes, (iii) whether the contracts between Canal Authority members and the Bureau contained language addressing priority allocation during times of shortage, and (iv)whether Canal Authority members could challenge the validity of the CVP contracts.
The California legislature enacted area of origin statutes to address coucerns that the CVP would reduce the amount of water available for local use
within the Sacramento River Basin and Delta area. The primary statute at issue, CWC § 11460, gives priority water rights to users within the area of origin
over export appropriations. Although the Bureau's appropriations were subject to the area of origin statutes, these statutes only impacted the total amount
of water the Bureau could appropriate and did not dictate subsequent allocation under CVP contracts.
In affirming the district court's decision, the court explained in detail the
way the Bureau had interpreted the applicability of area of origin statutes to
CVP water contracts. The court pointed to a paper the Bureau issued articulating its stance that the area of origin statutes applied to water priority rights, not
delivery of water under CVP contracts. The court further noted the Bureau
had been consistent in this approach throughout the renewal contract negotiation process. The court therefore held the Bureau's decision to reduce allocations was not arbitrary.
Although the CVP contracts clearly indicated the Bureau's authority to reduce distributions during times of water shortage, the court noted this language
could not disregard applicable law. However, the court found the contracts did
not flout applicable law, given that courts have upheld the SWRCB's interpretations that Canal Authority members did not have priority to water under S
11460. In addition, the court noted the contracts lacked any language granting
area of origin priority to members of the Canal Authority.
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The court also referenced the validation process each of the Canal Authority members completed. The court held the validation process ensured all
provisions in the CVP contracts were enforceable. The validated contracts,
therefore, prohibited Canal Authority members from challenging the contract
provisions granting the Bureau discretion to reduce allocations during times of
water shortage.
Ultimately, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment because the Bureau's authority to reduce allocations during times of
shortage was a valid contractual provision, and the contracts contained no provision for area of origin priority. In addition, the CWC's area of origin statutes
did not require area of origin priority in the allocation of water under the CVP
contracts.
RafaelMendez
John v. United States, 720 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding (i) the 1999
Rules, promulgated by the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture, properly
implemented Katie John I and the federal reserved water rights doctrine; (ii)
the Secretaries properly determined Alaskan "public lands" with a priority for
rural subsistence hunting and fishing under Tide VIII of ANILCA included
waters appurtenant to federal reservations, but (iii) excluded lands upstream.
and downstream of reservations; and (iv) the Federal Subsistence Board
should determine federal reserved water rights for Alaska Native Settlements
on a case-by-case basis).
In 1980 Congress enacted the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA") to conserve approximately 105 million acres of Alaskan
public land. ANILCA expresses a preference for Alaskan management of its
provisions, but the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture ("Secretaries")
have the authority to implement ANILCA if Alaska fails to do so. Alaska lost
certification to implement ANILCA in 1990 following McDowell v. Alaska. In
McDowell, the Alaska Supreme Court found ANILCA's rural subsistence
priority violated the Alaskan state constitution because the priority did not
accord with Alaskan subsistence lifestyles.
When Alaska lost its certification, implementation of ANILCA fell back
to the federal government. Since then, the Secretaries and the courts have
further developed the meaning of "public lands." ANILCA defines "public.
lands" as federal lands, waters, and interests therein, except for lands conveyed
or selected for conveyance to Alaska under the Alaska Statehood Act or to a
Native Corporation under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
("ANCSA"). Title VIII of ANILCA grants a priority to hunting and fishing for
rural subsistence over hunting and fishing for other purposes on "public
lands." In 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
("court") found in Alaska v Babbitt ("KatieJohn I') that, contrary to the Secretaries' 1992 Rules, "public lands" under Title VIII included some navigable
waters and that the Secretaries possessed the authority to identify those waters.
In response, the Secretaries issued the 1999 Final Rules ("1999 Rules"). The
1999 Rules brought navigable waters with a federal reserved water right under
the aegis of ANILCA. The 1999 Rules also identified federal land units that
possessed federal reserved water rights. These 34 land units included non-

